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Abstract
This paper investigates how incomplete information impacts the response of prices to nominal
shocks. Our baseline model is a variant of the Calvo model in which firms observe the underlying
nominal shocks with noise. In this model, the response of prices is pinned down by three
parameters: the precision of available information about the nominal shock; the frequency of
price adjustment; and the degree of strategic complementarity in pricing decisions. This result
synthesizes the broader lessons of the pertinent literature. We next highlight that this synthesis
provides only a partial view of the role of incomplete information. In general, the precision
of information does not pin down the response of higher-order beliefs. Therefore, one cannot
quantify the degree of price inertia without additional information about the dynamics of higher-
order beliefs, or the agents' forecasts of inflation. We highlight the distinct role of higher-order
beliefs with three extensions of our baseline model, all of which break the tight connection
between the precision of information and higher-order beliefs featured in previous work.
"Thi.s paper was prepared lor the 2008 SNIV-'MK conference on "Incomplete Information and Mt)netary Policy,"
hosted by the Gerzensee Study Center, Switzerland. We received useful comments from multiple conference partici-
pants. We are particularly grateful to our discussants, Stephen Morris and Elmar Mertens, and to the organizers of
the conference, Sergio Rebelo and Robert King.

1 Introduction
How much, and how quickly, do prices respond to nominal shocks? This is one of the most funda-
mental questions in macroeconomics: it is key to understanding the sources and the propagation of
the business cj'cle, as well as the power of monetary policy to control real economic activity.
To address this question, one strand of the literature has focused on menu costs and other fric-
tions in adjusting prices; this includes both convenient time-dependent models and state-dependent
adjustment models. Price rigidities are then identified as the key force behind price inertia. Another
strand of the literature has focused on informational frictions; this strand highlights that firnrs may
fail to adjust their price to nominal shocks, not because it is costly or impossible to do so, but
rather because they have imperfect information about these shocks. The older literature formal-
ized this imperfection as a geographical dispersion of the available information (Lucas, 1972, Barro,
1976); more recent contributions ha\'e proposed infrequent updating of information (Mankiw and
Reis, 2002; Reis, 2006) or rational inattention (Sims, 2003; Woodford, 2003, 2008; Machowiak and
Wiederholt, 2008). One way or another, though, the key driving force behind price inertia is that
firms happen, or choose, to have imperfect knowledge of the underlying nominal shocks.
The starting point of this paper is a bridge between these two approaches. In particular, our
basehne model is a hybrid of Calvo (1983), Morris and Shin (2002), and Woodford (2003): on the
one hand, firms can adjust prices only infrequenth', as in Calvo; on the other hand, firms observe
the underl)'ing nominal shocks only with noise, similarly to Morris-Shin and Woodford.
Within this baseline model, the response of prices to nominal shocks—and hence also the real
impact of these shocks— is characterized by the interaction of three key parameters; the precision
of a\'ailable information about the underlying nominal shocks (equivalently, the level of noise in
the firms' signals of these shocks); the frequency of price adjustment; and the degree of strategic
complementarity in pricing decisions. That all three parameters should matter is obvious; but
their interaction is also interesting. The combination of sticky prices and strategic complementarity
implies that the incompleteness of information can have lasting effects on inflation and real output
even if the shocks become commonly known very <iuickly. This is because firms that lia\-e full
information about the shock at the time they set prices will find it optimal to adjust only partly
to the extent that other firms had only incomplete information at the time they had set their
prices. Moreover, incomplete information can help make inflation peak after real output, which
seems consistent with available evidence based on structural VARs.
These findings sj'nthesize, and marginally extend, various lessons from the pertinent literature
with regard to how frictions in either price adjustment or information about the underlying nominal
shocks impact the response of prices to these shocks. This synthesis has its own value, as it provides
a simple and tractable incomplete-information version of the Calvo model that could readily be
taken to the data. Nevertheless, this synthesis is not the main contribution of the paper. Rather,
the main contribution of the paper is, first, to highlight that the aforementioned lessons miss the
distinct role that higher-order beliefs play in the dynamics of price adjustment and, second, to show
how this distinct role can be parsimoniously accommodated within our Calvo-like framework.
The basic idea behind our contribution is simple. The precision of the firms' information about
the underlying nominal shock identifies how fast the firms' forecasts of the shock respond to the true
shock; the more precise their information, the faster their forecasts converge to the truth. However,
this need not also identify how fast the forecasts of the forecasts of others may adjust. In other
words, the prec:ision of available information pins down the response of first-order beliefs, but not
necessarily the response of higher-order beliefs. But when prices are strategic complements, the
response of the price level to the underlying shock depends heavily on the response of higher-order
behefs. It follows that neither the precision of available information nor the degree of price rigidity
suffice for calibrating the degree of price inertia at the macro level.
To better understand this point, it is useful to abstract for a moment from sticky prices. Assume,
in particular, that all firms can adjust their prices in any given period and that the prices they set
are given by the following simple pricing rule;
... ,: ,
", p,: = (1 - Q')E,(9-KaE,p . -.,,/ ,. ^
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where pj is the price set by firm i, 6 is nominal demand, p is the aggregate price level, a £ (0,1) is the
degree of strategic complementarity in pricing decisions, and E, denotes the expectation conditional
on the information of firm i. Aggregating this condition and iterating over the expectations of the
price level, we infer that the aggregate price level must satisfy the following condition;
where £'''" denotes the /c"*-order average forecast of ^.' It then follows that the response of price
level p to an innovation in 6 depends on the response of the entire sequence of different orders of
beliefs, {£''^}^j, to that shock.
'The fc"'-order average forecasts are defined recursively as follows: E^ is the cross-sectional mean of the firms'
forecasts of the underlying nominal shock; £^ is the cross-sectional mean of the firms' forecasts of £'; and so on.
When information is perfect or at least commonly shared, then E^ = E^ for all k. It then follows
that the response of prices to an innovation in 9 depends merely on the response of first-order beliefs,
which in turn is pinned down by the precision of the available information about 6. When, instead,
information is dispersed, higher-order beliefs need not coincide with first-order beliefs.
The potential role of higher-order beliefs has been noted before by Morris and Shin (2002),
Woodford (2003), and others. However, in the standard Gaussian example used in the pertinent
literature, the sensitivity of higher-order beliefs to the shock is tightly connected to that of first-
order beliefs: higher-order beliefs can be less sensitive to the underlying shock only if the precision
of information about the shock is lower, in which case first-order beliefs are also less sensitive. It
follows that in the standard Gaussian example the precision of information about the underlying
nominal shock remains the key determinant of the response of the price level to the shock. However,
once one goes away from the standard Gaussian example, this tight connection between first- and
higher-order beliefs can break—and the break can be quite significant.
We highlight the crucial and distinct role of higher-order beliefs with three variants of our
baseline model. All three variants retain the combination of infrequent price adjustment (as in
Calvo) and noisy information about the underlying shocks (as in Morris-Shin and Woodford), but
differentiate in the specification of higher-order beliefs.
In the first variant, firms face uncertainty, not only about the size of the aggregate nominal shock,
but also about the precision of the signals that other firms receive about this shock. This extension
helps isolate the role of higher-order beliefs or, equivalently, the role of strategic uncertainty: we
show how this additional source of uncertamtj' about the distribution of precisions can impact the
response of higher-order beliefs to the underlying shocks, and thereby the response of prices, without
necessarily affecting the response of first-order beliefs.
In the second variant, we let firms hold heterogeneous priors about the stochastic properties of
the signals that other firms recei\'e. In this economy, firms expect the beliefs of others to adjust
more slowly to the underlying shocks than their own beliefs. They thus behave in equilibrium
as if they lived in a economy where all other firms had less precise information than what they
themselves have. This in turn helps rationalize why equilibrium prices may adjust very slowly to
the underlying nominal shocks even if the frequency of price adjustment is arbitrarily high and each
firm has arbitrarily precise information about the underlying nominal shock. Once again, the key
is the inertia of higher-order beliefs; heterogeneous priors is a convenient modeling device.
The aforementioned two variants focus on how higher-order beUefs impact the propagation of
nominal shocks in the economy. In the third and final variant, we show how higher-order beliefs can
be the source of fluctuations in the economy—how they can themselves be one of the "structural"
shocks. In particular, we show how variation in higher-order beliefs that is orthogonal to either the
underlying nominal shocks or the firms information about these shocks can generate fluctuations in
inflation and real output that resemble those generated by "cost-push" shocks.
Combined, these flndings point out that a macroeconomist who wishes to quantify the response of
the economy to its underlying structural shocks, or even to identify what are these structural shocks
in the first place, may need appropriate information, not only about the degree of price rigidity and
the firms' information (beliefs) about these shocks, but also about the stochastic properties of their
forecasts of the forecasts of others (higher-order beliefs).
Because the hierarchy of beliefs is an infinitely dimensional object, incorporating the distinct
role of higher-order beliefs in macroeconomic models may appear to be a challenging task. Part of
the contribution of the paper is to show that this is not the case. All the models we present here
are highly parsimonious and nevertheless allow for rich dynamics in higher-order beliefs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relation of our paper to
the literature. Section 3 studies our baseline model, which introduces incomplete information in the
Calvo model. Section 4 studies the variant with uncertainty about the precisions of one another.
Section 5 studies the variant that with heterogeneous priors. Section 6 turns to cost-push shocks.
Section 7 concludes with suggestions for future research. All proofs are in the Appendix,
,; ,,,
2 Related literature
The macroeconomics literature on informational frictions has a long history, going back to Phelps
(1970), Lucas (1972, 1975), Barro (1976), Kmg (1983) and Townsend (1983). Recently, this litera-
ture has been revived by Mankiw and Reis (2002), Morris and Shin (2002), Sims (2003), Woodford
(2003), and subsequent work.^ This paper contributes to this literature in two ways: first, by
studying the interaction of incomplete information with price rigidities within the Calvo model;
second, and most importantly, by furthering our understanding of the distinct role of higher-order
^See, e.g., Amato and Shin (2006), Angeletos and La'O (2008, 2009a, 2009b), Angeletos and Pavan (2007),
Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005), Collard and Delias (2005), Hellwig (2005), Lorenzoni (2008, 2009), Mackowiak and
Wiederholt (2008, 2009), Nimark (2007, 2008), and Reis (2006).
beliefs. Closely related in this respect is Angeletos and La'O (2009a), which emphasizes how dis-
persed information has verj' distinct implications for the business cycle than uncertainty about the
fundamentals.
Our paper is highly complementary to the papers by Woodford (2003) and Morris and Shin (2002,
2006). These papers document how higher-order beliefs may respond less to information about the
underlying shocks than first-order beliefs, simply because they a.re more a.nchored to the common
prior. "^ However, by adopting the convenience of a popular but very specific Gaussian information
structure, they have also restricted attention to settings where the response of higher-order beliefs is
tightly tied to the response of first-order beliefs: in their settings, the response of higher-order beliefs
is a monotone transformation of the response of first-order beliefs, thus precluding any independent
role for higher-order beliefs.
Our paper, instead, highlights that, whereas the response of first-order beliefs to the underlying
nominals shocks is pinned down solely by the level of uncertainty about these shocks, the response
of higher-order beliefs depends also on other sources of uncertainty, such as uncertainty about the
precision of others' information. Furthermore, it shows how with heterogeneous priors it is possible
that higher-order beliefs respond very little, or even not at all, to the underlying shocks even if
all firms are nearly perfectly informed about these shocks (in which case first-order beliefs respond
nearly one-to-one with the shock).
Closely related are also the papers bj' Nimark (2008) and Klenow and Willis (2007). The former
paper studies a similar framework as ours, namely a Calvo model with incomplete information, along
with a more complex learning dynamics: unlike our paper and rather as in Woodford (2003), the
underlying shocks do not become common knowledge after one-period delay. The latter paper stud-
ies a menu-cost model with sticky information. Much alike our baseline model, both papers study
the interaction of price rigidities and informational frictions. However, these papers do disentangle
the role of higher-order beliefs as we do in this paper. In particular, the quantitative importance of
incomplete information in these papers is tied to the precision of information about the underlying
shocks at the time of price changes. In contrast, our paper shows how one can disentangle the
dynamics of higher-oder beliefs from the speed of learning, and uses this to argue that significant
price inertia at the macro level can be consistent with both significant price flexibility at the micro
level and fast learning about the underlying nominal shocks.
^A similar role of higher-order beliefs has been highlighted by Allen, Morris and Shin (2005), Angeletos, Lorenzoni
and Pavan (2007) and Bacchetta and Wincoop (2005) within the context of financial markets.
Finally, the heterogeneous-priors variant of this paper builds on Angeletos and La'O (2009b), In
that paper we consider a real-business-cycle model in which firms have dispersed information about
the underlying productivity shocks. We then show how dispersed information opens the door to a
certain type of sunspot-like fluctuations—i.e., fluctuations that cannot be explained by variation in
either the underlying economic fundamentals or the firms' beliefs about these fundamentals. These
fluctuations obtain also under a common prior, but are easier to model with heterogeneous priors.
The present paper complements this other work by illustrating how these type of fluctuations can
take the form of cost-push shocks in a new-keynesian model, and how heterogeneous priors can also
help rationalize significant inertia in the response of prices to nominal shocks.
3 The Calvo Model with Incomplete Information '
In this section we consider a variant of the Calvo model that allows firms to have dispersed private
information about aggregate nominal demand.
Households and firms. The economy is populated by a representative household and a contin-
uum of firms that produce differentiated commodities. Firms are indexed by i G [0,1]. Time is
discrete, indexed by i £ {0, 1,2, ...}. There is no capital, so that there is no saving in equilibrium.
Along with the fact that there is a representative household, we can also abstract from asset trading.
The preferences of the household are given by '^^p^U{Ct,Nt), with
/.. ..;v-,; U{Ct,Nt) = \ogCt~Nt, ,
'
where /3 6 (0, 1) is the discount rate, Nt is the labor supplied by the household,
a- CJ di
'7-1
is the familiar CES aggregator, Ci,t is the consumption of the connnodity produced by firm i, and
r] > is the elasticity of substitution across commodities. As usual, this specification implies that
the demand for the commodity of firm i is given by
1
where Pt=\j P^'^ di ^ ^ is the aggregate price index.
The output of firm i, on the other hand, is given by '
where A,.; is the idiosyncratic productivity shock and e e (0, 1) parameterizes the degree of dimin-
ishing returns.
By the resource constraint for each commodity, we have that F,,t — Ci,i for all i and therefore
aggregate output is given by Yt — Ct. Finally, aggregate nominal demand is given by the following
quantity-theor}' or cash-in-advance constraint:
PtCt = Qf
Here, 6( denotes the level of aggregate nominal demand (aggregate nominal GDP), is assumed to
be exogenous, and defines the "monetary shock" of our model.
In what follows, we use lower-case variables for the logarithms of the corresponding upper-case
variables: dt = log6(, yt = logF^, pt = logPt, and so on. We also assume that all exogenous
shocks are log-normally distributed, which guarantees that the equilibrium admits an exact log-
linear solution.
Shocks and information. Aggregate nominal demand is assumed to follow a random walk:
et^Ot-i + vt
where Vt ~ A/'(0, a^) is white noise. Each period has two stages, a morning and an evenmg. Let ij^
and Jj"j denote the information set of firm i during, respectively, the morning and the evening of
period t. Information about the current level of nominal demand is imperfect during the morning
but perfect during the evening. The information that a firm has about 6t during the morning is
summarized in a Gaussian private signal of the following form:
Xl,t = Ot -fc,,,,
where Six ~ A/'(0, at^) is purely idiosyncratic noise (i,i,d. across firms). Pricing choices (for the firms
that have the option to set prices) are made in the morning, while information about 6t is imperfect;
employment and .consumption choices are made in the evening, once 9t has been publicly revealed.
Finally, we assume that the idiosyncratic productivity shock a,,( follows a random walk and that it
is known to the firm from the beginning of the period.
The information of firm i in the morning of period t is therefore given by l/^ = If^_^U{x,^t, o,i.t},
while her information in the evening of the same period is given by Ifj = X/(_j U{9t}. We will see in
a moment that, in equilibrium, pt-i and yt-i are functions of {9t-i,0t-2, }', it would thus make
no difference if we had included past values of the price level and real GDP in the information set
of the firm. Similarly, y,,t is a function of 1;,;; it would thus make no difference if we had included
the realized level of a firm's demand into its evening information set.
The assumption that 9t becomes common knowledge at the end of each period is neither random
nor inconsequential. If we wished information about 9t to remain dispersed after the end of period t,
we would need somehow to limit the aggregation of information that takes place through commodity
markets. That would require a more decentralized trading structure and would complicate the
necessary micro-foundations. Furthermore, the dynamics would now become much less tractable:
as in Townsend (1983), Nimark (2008), and others, firms would now have to keep tract of the entire
history of their information in order to forecast the forecasts of others, and the equilibrium dynamics
would cease to have any simple recursive structure. Here, we avoid all these complications, and
keep the analysis highly tractable, only by assuming, as in Lucas (1972), that 9t becomes common
knowledge after a short delay. However, it is important to recognize that, in so doing, we impose a
fast convergence of beliefs about the past shocks and also rule out any heterogeneity in the agents'
expectations of future shocks beyond the one in their beliefs about the current shock. One may
expect that relaxing these properties would add to even more inertia, both because firms would learn
more slowly (Woodford, 2003) and because expectations of future shocks could be more anchored
to public information (Morris and Shin, 2006).
Price-setting behavior. Consider for a moment the case where prices are flexible and the current
nominal shock is common knowledge at the moment firms set prices. The optimal price set by firm
i in period t is then given by
Pit = M + rnc^.t
where ^ = -^ is the monopolistic mark-up and mcj^t is the nominal marginal cost the firm faces
in the evening of period t. The latter is given by
1 - e 1
mc,j = wt -\ yi.t a,,(
e £
where Wt is the nominal wage rate in period t. From the representative household's optimality
condition for work,
Wt - pt = Ct.
From the consumer's demand,
Ci,f -C( = ~v{Pi,t -Pt)-
Fi-om market clearing, c,,; = y,.; and a = yt- Finally, from the cash-in-advance constraint, aggregate
real output is given by
yt ^ Ot - Pt-
Combining the aforementioned conditions, we conclude that the "target" price (i.e., the flexible-
price full-information optimal price) of firm i in period t is given by
Pit = {I - a)et + apt + ^r,t (1)
where
e + {l - i)r]
defines the degree of strategic complementarity in pricing decisions, and where
e 1
e + [I - it}ri e + (I - e)i]
is simply a linear transformation of the idiosyncratic productivity shock. We henceforth normalize
the mean of the idiosyncratic productivity shock so that the cross-sectional mean of ^,,( is zero.
If prices had been flexible and 9t had been common knowledge in the begging of period t, the
firm would set p,,( = p*^ in all periods and states. However, we have assumed that firms have only
imperfect information. Moreover, following Calvo (1983), we assume that a firm may change its
price only with probability 1 — A during any given period, where A G (0, 1). It then follows that, in
the event that a firm changes its price, the price it chooses is equal (up to a constant) to its current
expectation of a weighted average of the current and all future target prices:
1E,,( {\ - 0\)Y^{0xy pU^ (2)
where p G (0, 1) is the discount factor, A is the probability that the firm won't have the option to
adjust its price (a measure of how sticky prices are), and Et_f is the expectation conditional on the
information set of firm i in period t^
Combining conditions (1) and (2), we conclude tliat the price set by any firm that gets the
chance to adjust its price in period t is given by
oo
p,,t = (1 - 0X) Y, iP^y [(1 - Cl') ^^A+J + QE^,tP(+J + ^iAi,t+j] (3)
In the remainder of the paper, we treat condition (3) as if it were an exogenous behavioral rule,
with the understanding though that this rule is actually fully microfounded in equilibrium.
Equilibrium dynamics. The economy effectively reduces to a dynamic game of incomplete in-
formation, with condition (3) representing the best response of the typical firm, The eqiiilii)riinn
notion we adopt is standard Perfect-Bayesian Equilibrium.^ Because of the linearity of the best-
response condition (3) and the Gaussian specification of the information structure, it is a safe guess
that the equilibrium strategy will have a linear form. We thus conjecture the existence of equilibria
in which the price set by a firm in period i is a linear function of (pt_i, ^t-i,a;t,(,<^i,t):
Pi,t = P{Pt-i,9t-i,Xi,f^i,t) = bjpt-i+b2X,^t + b3et-}+^i,t (4)
for some coefficients 61,62,^3- This particular guess is justified by the following reasoning: we
expect pt-i to matter because of a fraction of firms cannot adjust prices; Xij because it conveys
information about the current nominal shock Ot; Ot-\ because it is the prior about Of, and S,i^t for
obvious reasons.
Given this guess, and given the fact that only a randomly selected fraction 1 - A of firms can
adjust prices in any given period, we infer that the aggregate price level must satisfy
Pt = Xpt-i + il-X)J J PiPt-i.0t-i;x,OdFt{x)dGtiO
where Ft denotes the cross-sectional distribution of the private signals (conditional on the current
shock 9t) and Gt denotes the cross-sectional distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks. Given that P
''To be precise, condition (2) should have been written as p,.,. = const + E,,, (1 - 0X) YlTLo {P-^V P'+j > where
const is an endogenous quantity that involves second-order moments and that emerges due to risk aversion. However,
under the log-normal structure of shocks and signals that we have assumed, these second-order moments are invariant
with either the shock or the information of the firms, and it is thus without any loss of generality to ignore the
aforementioned constant.
We can safely ignore out-of-equilibrium paths by assuming that firms observe (at most) the cross-section distri-
bution of prices, which guarantees that no individual deviation is detectable,
10
is linear, that the cross-sectional average of X( is 9t, and that cross-sectional average of ^t is 0, we
can re-write the above as pt = ^Pt-i + (1 — -^) P[Pt-i^ ^t-v, 9t, 0), or equivalently as
Pt = ClPt-l + C20t + C39t-l (5)
where
ci = A + (1-A)6i, C2 = (l-A)62 C3 = (l-A)63. (6)
Next, note that we can rewrite (3) in recursive form as
p,,t = (1 - /3A) [(1 - a) E,,tOt + aE,,tPt + i,.,t] + iPX)E^,tP^,t+l
Using (4) and (5) into the right-hand side of the above condition, we infer that the price must satisfy
p,,t = (1-/3A) [(1 - q) E,,t0f + aE^^tPt + ^^,t] + {P^) [^iE„tPt + b2E^,tet + b^E^^A+i + E,.,s^,,t+i] . (7)
Next, note that
Er^t9t+i = Ei,t9t = — Xit + — 9t-i and E,.,^,,,+i = 4,,t,
where k^ = a^"^ is the precision of the firms' signals and k^ s a^" is the precision of the common
prior about the innovation in 9. Using these facts, and substituting pt from (5) into (7), we can
rewrite the left-hand side of (7) as a linear function of p(_i, Jt,(, ^(-i, and 4,^(. For this to coincide
with our conjecture in (4), it is necessary and sufficient that the coefficients (61,62,^3) solve the
following system:
61 = (l-/3A)aci + (/3A)6iCi
62 = [(1 - /3A)(1 - Q + QC2) + (/?A)(6iC2 + 62 + 63)]
^^
(8)
^3 = 1(1 -;3\){\-a + ac2) + (/3A)(6iC2 + bz + ^3)] "".^
+(1 - ,3A)ac3 + (/3A)6iC3
We conclude that an equilibrium is pinned down by the joint solution of (6) and (8).
Combining the conditions for c\ and 61, we get that C\ must solve the following equation:
This equation admits two solutions: one with ci > 1 and another with ci € (A, 1). We ignore
the former solution because it leads to explosive price paths and henceforth limit attention to the
11
latter solution. Note that this solution is independent of the information structure; indeed, the
coefficient ci, which identifies the endogenous persistence in the price level, coincides with the one
in the standard (complete-information) Calvo model.
Given this solution for ci, the remaining conditions define a linear system that admits a unique
solution for the remainder of the coefficients. It is straightforward to check that the solution satisfies
Ci + C2 + C3 = 1,
which simply means that the price process is homogenous of degree one in the level of nominal
demand. Furthermore,
_
A(l-ci)
which identifies the sensitivity of the price level to the current innovation in nominal demand as
an increasing function of the precision of available information. We therefore reach the following
characterization of the equilibrium.
Proposition 1. (i) There exists an. equililmum m which the pricmg strategy of a firm is given by
and the aggregate price level is given by - :
" Pt "= CiPt-l + C29t + C-iOt-l
for some positive coefficients [hi, b2,b2,) anrf (cj, C2, C3).
(ii) The equilibrium values of the coefficients (C],C2,C3) satisfy the folloiuing properties: cj is
increasing in X, increasing in a, and invariant to Kx/kq; €2 is non-monotone in A, decreasing in a,
and increasing in Kx/kq; C3 is non-monotone in a, and decreasing in Kx/kq.
The comparative statics described in part (ii) are illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and .3. The baseline
parameterization we use for these figures, as well as for the impulse responses that wc report later
on, is as follows. We identify the length of a period with one year; this seems a good benchmark for
how long it takes for macro data to become widely available.^ We accordingly set = .95 (which
^A qualification is due here. The fact that these data are widely available .suggests tliat most agents are likely to
be well informed about them. This in turn implies that their first-order beliefs are likely to converge to the truth
very fast. However, to the extent that this fact is not common knowledge, it is possible that higher-order beliefs do
not converge as fast, which could contribute to further inertia in the response of prices.
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means a discount rate of about 1% per quarter), A — .20 (which means a probabiUty of price change
equal to 1/3 per quarter), and a = .85 (which means a quite strong complementarity in pricing
decisions); these values are consistent with standard calibrations of the Calvo model. Lacking any
obvious estimate of the precision of information about the underlj'ing shocks, we set Kx/kq = 1;
this means that the variance of the forecast error of the typical firm about the current innovation
in nommal demand is one half the variance of the innovation itself.^
Figure 1 plots the coefficients ci, C2, and C3 as functions of the Calvo parameter A, the probability
the firm does not re^'ise its price in a given period. We observe that ci is increasing m A, C3 is
decreasing in A, and co is non-monotonic in A (it increases for low values but decreases for high
values). Figure 2 plots these coefficients as functions of q, the degree of strategic complementarity
in pricing decisions. We observe that ci is an increasing function in o, C2 is a decreasing function
in a, and C3 is non-monotonic in a. Finally, Figure 3 plots these coefficients as functions of Hx/ 1^0,
the ratio of the precision of private signals to the precision of the prior. We see that C2 is increasing
in this ration, while C3 is decreasing and c\ is invariant.
The comparative statics described above are a hybrid of the results found in sticky-price Calvo
models and in the incomplete-information literature. As in the standard Calvo model, the aggregate
price level is persistent due to the fact that some firms cannot adjust prices. In our model, the
coefficient which characterizes the persistence of the aggregate price process is ci. We find that
this coefficient is unaffected by the incompleteness of information. In this sense, the persistence of
prices in our baseline model is the same as in the standard Calvo model. This property, however,
hinges on our assumption that the nominal shock becomes common knowledge only with a delay of
one period. If we increase the length of this delay, then we can obtain more persistence, similarlj' to
Woodford (2003) or Nimark (2008), but only till the shock becomes common knowledge; after that
point, any subsequence persistence is driven solely by the Calvo rigidity. The property, then, that Ci
is increasing in the Calvo parameter A should be familiar: it is almost the mechanical implication of
the fact that a fraction A of firms do not adjust prices. The impact of q on ci is also familiar: even
under complete information, firms who can adjust their price following a monetary shock will find
it optimal to stay closer to the past price level the higher the degree of strategic complementarity
between them and the firms that cannot adjust (and that are thus stuck to the past price level).
'Note that only the ratio Ki/ks, and not the absolute values of Ki and Ke, matter for the equilibrium coefficients
ci,C2, and C3. In other words, once we fix Ki/fca, Kg is only a scaling parameter. By implication, the impulse responses
of the economy to a one-standard-deviation change in v are invariant to K.g.
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Where the incompleteness of information has a bite in our baseline model is on the coefficients
C2 and C3, which characterize, respectively, the price nnpact of the current and the peist shock for
any given past price level. To understand how the precision of information affects these coefficients,
consider the choice of the price-setting firm. The price chosen by a firm is a linear combination of
past prices and past nominal shocks (which are common knowledge among all firms) and the firm's
own expectation of current nominal demand (which is unknown in the current period). Aggregating
a.cross firms, we find that the aggregate price level is a linear combination of past price levels and
past nominal shocks and of the average expectation of 6t As in any static incomplete information
model with Gaussian signals, the firm's own expectation of the fundamental is merely a weighted
combination of his private signal and the common prior, which here coincides with 6t-\. If firms
have less precise private information relative to the prior, i.e., lower k^/ho, they place less weight
on their private signals than on their prior when forming their expectations of 9t. As a result, the
average expectation is less sensitive to the current shock Ot-i and more anchored to the past shock
Ot-i- This explains why less precise information (a lower Kx/ko) implies a lower C2 and a higher C3.
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Figure 4 Figure 5
Impulse responses. The above analysis highlights how introducing incompleteness of information
into the Calvo niodoi dampens the response of prices to the underlying nonunal shocks—the precision
of information becomes a key parameter for the djmamics of inflation along with the Calvo parameter
and the degree of strategic complementarity. To further appreciate this, we now study how the
precision of information affects the impulse responses of the inflation rate and real output to an
innovation in nominal demand.
Figures 4 and 5 plot these impulse responses. (Inflation in period t is given by pt - Pt-i, while
real output is yt — dt ~ Pt-) As before, we identify the period with a year and set 3 = .95, A = .20
and a — .85. We then consider three alternative values for the precision of information: n^-fK-g = 1,
which is our baseline; Kx/ng = oo, which corresponds to the extreme of perfect information (as in
the standard Calvo model); and Kx/ng — 0, which corresponds to the alternative extreme, that of
no information about the current shock other than the prior (i.e., the past shock).
From Figure 4, we see that the incompleteness of information has important effects on inflation
dynamics relative to the complete information Calvo model. First, the instantaneous impact effect
of a monetary shock on inflation is increasing in Kx/ng. As the noise in private information increases,
prices react less initially to a nominal disturbance. Secondly, as the precision of private information
decreases, we observe that second period inflation becomes higher and highc-r. As the jmst nominal
demand now becomes common knowledge, prices with low sensitivity to the monetary shock last
period greatly increase in the second period to reflect this new information. Except for sufficiently
high values of Kj/Kg, this is where inflation reaches its peak. Lastly, although the decay rate of
inflation is constant after this date, because of the high inflation experienced in the second period,
lower Kxl ng leads to a higher level of inflation for all subsequent periods.
From Figure 5, we then observe that the impact effect of a monetary shock on output is decreasing
in the precision of private information. Of course, this is simply the mirror image of what happens
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to prices. Furthermore, like the impulse responses for inflation, real output is higher for lower levels
of Kx/ng for all subsequent periods.
It is interesting here to note that incomplete information has lasting effects on the levels of
inflation and real GDP even though the shocks become common knowledge after just one period.
This is precisely because of the interaction of incomplete information with price staggering and
with strategic complementarity: by the time the shock becomes common knowledge, some firms
have already set their price on the basis of incomplete information about the shock; strategic
complementarity then guarantees that the firms that now have access to full information will still
find it optimal to respond to the shock as if themselves had incomplete information.
Note that, except for high values of K^/Ke. we observe that the peak of output occurs before
the peak in inflation. This is in contrast to the standard Calvo model which predicts strong price
increases during the period in which the shock is realized and therefore typically has inflation
peaking before output. A similar observation has been made in Woodford (2003), but with two
important differences: Woodford (2003) abstracts from price staggering; it also assumes that past
shocks and past outcomes never become known, thus appearing to require an implausibly slow degree
of learning about the underlying shocks. Here, we show how the empirically appealing property
that inflation peaks after real output can be obtained even with quite fast learning, provided one
interacts incomplete information with price staggering.
In the present model, the peak of inflation happens at most one period after the innovation
in 6. This particular property is an artifact of the assumption that the shock becomes common
knowledge exactly one period after the innovation takes place. If we extend the model so that the
shock becomes common knowledge a.fter, sa.y, 4 periods, then the peak in inflation can occur as late
as 4 periods after the shock. The more general insight is that inflation can start low if firms initially
have little information about the innovation and can rise in the early phases of learnmg, but once
firms have accumulated enough information about the shock then infiation will begin to fall. In
other words, the dynamics of learning are essential for the dynamics of inflation only as long as the
firms remain sufficiently uncertain about the shock; but once tlie firms have learned enoiigh about
the shock, the subsequent dynamics of inflation are determined primarily by the Calvo mec;hanics.
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4 Uncertainty about precisions
The analysis so far has focused on a Gaussian specification for the information structure that is
quite standard in the pertinent Uterature. Under this specification, we show that the response of
prices to nominal shocks was determined by three parameters: (i) the degree of price rigidity; (ii)
the degree of strategic complementarity; and (iii) the precision of information about the underlying
nominal shock. In this section we show that, under a plausible variation of the information structure,
knowledge of these parameters need not suffice for calibrating the degree of price inertia. The key
insight is that the precision of information about the underlying shock pins down the response of
the firms' forecasts of this shock, but not necessarily the response of their forecasts of the forecasts
of other firms (i.e., their higher-order beliefs); and what matters for the response of equilibrium
prices to the shock is not only the former but also the latter.
Apart from serving as an example for this more general insight, the variant we consider here
has its own appeal in that it introduces a plausible source of uncertainty: it allows firms to face
uncertainty regarding the precision of information that other firms may have regarding nominal
demand. In particular, we introduce a second aggregate state variable, which permits us to capture
uncertainty about the average precision of available information in the cross-section of the economy.
This new state variable is modeled as a binary random variable, St G {h,l}, which is i.i.d. over
time and independent of the nominal shock df, and which takes each of the two possible values h
and / with probability 1/2. Let 7, k^, ki be scalars, commonly known to all firms, with 1/2 < 7 < 1
and < K; < Kh- The "type" of a firm is now given by the pair (^i.t, Kj,*), where Xj^t = ^t + Si,t is
the particular signal the firm receives about the current nominal shock, £,,f ~ A^(0, l/^i.t) is the
noise in this signal, and k^j is its precision. The latter is specific to the firm and is contingent on
the new state variable St as follows: when this state is St — h. the precision of firm i is k,,^ = k^
with probability 7 and k,,( — k.( with probability 1 - 7; and, symmetrically, when the state is S( = /,
the precision of firm i is Kj,( = ki with probability 7 and «.,,( — k,/, with probability 1 - 7. Finally,
because these realizations are independent across the firms, 7 is also the fraction of the population
whose signals have precision Ks when the state is s, for s € {/), /}.
Note that a firm knows his own «,(, but not the underlying state Sf. A firm's Kj^j thus serves
a double role: it is both the precision of the firm's own information about the nominal shock
9t and a noisy signal of the average precision in the cross-section of the economy. Therefore,
the key difference from the baseline model is the property that firms face an additional source of
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informational heterogeneity: they face uncertainty regarding how informed other firms might be
about the nominal demand shock. Note then that the coefficient 7 parameterizes the level of this
heterogeneity: when 7 = 1, all firms have the same precisions, and this fact is common knowledge;
when instead 7 G (1/2, 1), different firms have different precisions, and each firm is uncertain about
the distribution of precisions in the rest of the population.
Furthermore, note that knowing the state variable s> would not help any firm improve his forecast
of the nominal shock 9t. This is simply because belief of a firm about the nominal shock depends
only on its own precision (which the firm knows), not on the precisions of other firms (which the firm
does not know). Nevertheless, the firm would love to know st because this could help him improve
his forecast of the forecasts and actions of other firms in equilibrium. Indeed, since an firm's own
expectation of Ot depends on both his Xit and his k.j^, it is a safe guess that the equilibrium choice
of the firm also depe.nds on both xu and Kit and therefore that the aggregate price level depends
both on 9t and on Kf. It then follows that firms face imcertainty about the aggregate price level, not
only because they do not know the underlying innovation in &t> but also because they don't know
how precisely other firms are informed about this shock. Finally, note that, while the uncertainty
about 6t matters for individual pricing behavior, and hence for aggregate prices, even when firms'
pricing decisions are strategically independent (a — 0), the uncertainty about Sf matters only when
their pricing decisions are interdependent (a / 0). This highlights the distinctive nature of the
additional source of uncertainty that we have introduced in this section.
To better appreciate this point, it is useful to study the stochastic properties of the hierarchy
of beliefs about 9. Let E^ denote the cross-sectional average of Ejt[^f] conditional on the current
state for the precisions being Sf. Next, for any fc > 2, let E^ denote the cross-sectional average
of Eif[Ef''^]; that's the k"^ -order average beliefs. Clearl}-, all these average beliefs are functions
of the current and past nominal shocks and the current precision state s^. Finally, let E^ denote
the expectation of the fc"'-order average belief conditional on the nominal shocks alone (that is,
averaging across the two possible st states). It is easy to check that
E^ = r]k9t + {l-Tik)9t-u
for some constant 77^. The constant rji^ = dEf/d9t thus identifies the sensitivity of the A'"'-order
average belief to the underlying nominal shock. As anticipated in the Introduction, the response of
the price level to the underlying nominal shock is determined by the sensitivities {rjk}-^
The discussion in the Introduction had abstracted from price rigidities (i.e., it had imposed A = 0), but the
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We illustrate the behavior of the hierarchy of beliefs in Figures 6 and 7. In Figure 6, we focus
on the impact of the precision of information when this precision is common knowledge. We thus
restrict k^ = k-i = k, (in which case 7 becomes irrelevant) and consider how the sensitivities of the
beliefs to the shock vary with k (which now identifies the common precision of information). We
then observe the following qualitative properties. First, the hierarchy of behefs about 9t converges
to the common prior expectation, ^t-i, as the signals become uninformative: for all k, r]k ^ as
K, -^ 0. Second, the beliefs converge to the true underlying state, Ot, as the signals become perfect;
for all fc, 7?fc —> 1 as K -4 00. Finally, whenever the signals are informative but not perfect, higher-
order beliefs are more anchored towards the prior than lower-order beliefs: for any k e (0,cx)),
1 > 7/1 > 7/2 > ... > 0.
In Figure 7, we turn our focus to the impact of the uncertainty regarding the precision of others'
information. In particular, we let k^ > ki and consider how the beliefs vary with the coefficient
7 (which parameterizes the heterogeneity of information regarding the underlying precision state).
W'e then observe that rji is invariant to 7, while ??2 and 773 increase with 7. That is, the sensitivity
of first-order beliefs to the nominal shock is independent of 7, while the sensitivities of higher-order
beliefs increase with 7.
Along with the fact that the price level depends not onl}' on first-order but also on higher-order
beliefs, we can expect that 7 should affect the response of the price level to the nominal shock even
though it does not affect the response of first-order beliefs. Indeed, following similar steps as in the
baseline model, we can solve for the equilibrium as follows.^
insight is clearly more general.
^As mentioned earlier, in both our baseline model and in all three variants of it, we identify the equilibrium as the
fixed pomt of the best-response condition (3). For the current variant, this is with some abuse, since the non-Gaussian
nature of the information structure implies that this condition is not exact: it is only a log-linear approximation.
However, the properties that first-order beliefs do not depend on 7, while higher-order beliefs and hence equilibrium
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Proposition 2. (i) There exists an equilibrium in. which the pricing strategy of a firm is given by
{biPt-\ + b2.hXi,t + bs^hdt-i if K'l.t = K,h
biPt-i + h.hXix + b3j,,6t--[ if K^^t = Ki
while the aggregate price level is given by
{cipt-i +C2^h0t + cs,kdt-i if St = h
ClPt-l + C2,h0t + C3M0t-l if St = I
for some coefficients [bi.bo.h^h^hh.h^hd) "'^^ (ci, C2,/i, C2,/, C3,/i, C3,;).
(ii) Let C2 = ^(c2,/i + C2,;) cind C3 = ^(cs,/, + C3,;) be the mean sensitivity of the price level to the
current and past nominal shock, averaging across the precision states. The equilibrium value of c\
does not depend on 7 and is identical to that in the baseline model, while the equilibrium values of
C2 and cs depend on 7 if and only if a ^ 0. '
This result is also illustrated in Figure 7, which plots the coeffirient C2 = E[dpt/df)t] as a function
of 7. We see that as 7 decreases, the sensitivity of the first-order beliefs to the current nominal shock
staj's constant, while the sensitivity of the price level decreases. Ss anticipated, this is because a
lower 7 decreases the sensitivity of second- and higher-order beliefs.
To recap, the example of this section has highlighted how, even if one were to fix the sensitivity
of the firms forecasts to the underlying nominal shock, one could still have significant freedom in
how higher-order beliefs, and thereby equilibrium prices, respond to the shock. This is important
for understanding the quantitative implications of incomplete information: to estimate the degree
of price inertia caused by incomplete information, one may need direct or indirect information,
not only about the firm's expectations about the underlying nominal shocks, but also about their
higher-order expectations.
Finally, it is interesting to note how a variant of the model we have introduced here could
generate the possibility that all firms are perfectly informed about the nominal shock, are free to
adjust their prices fully, and yet find it optimal to adjust only partly. To see this, suppose that
when the precision state is s — h all firms get Ki = co (which means that their signals are perfectly
informative); but when s — I, some firms get k, = 00 and others get k^ = (which means that
the signal is completely uninformative). Under this scenario, when the precision state is s = h, all
outcomes do depend on 7, do not hinge on this approximation. Finally, keep in mind that condition (3) is exact in
either the baseline model or the two other variants that we consider subsequently.
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firms are perfectly informed. However, this fact is not common knowledge, Tliis is because each
firm cannot tell whether she is perfectly informed because the state is s = /i or because the state is
s ~ I but she was among the lucky ones to receive the perfectly precise signals. As a result, each
firm must cissign positive probability to the event that some other firms might not be informed and
hence might not adjust their prices. But then because of strategic complementarity every firm will
find it optimal not to adjust fully to the shock. It follows that there exist events where all firms are
perfectly mformed about the shock and nevertheless do not fully adjust their prices.
Of course, in this last example the possibility that firms are perfectly informed and yet do not
respond perfectly to the shock can occur only with probability strictly less than one: the will also be
events where some firms are relative uninformed and nevertheless find it optimal to respond quite a
bit to the shock because they expect that other firms will be more informed. That is, this example
cannot generate situations where in all events firms are perfectly informed and nevertheless expect
other firms to be less informed. Indeed, based on the results of Kajii and Morris (1997) regarding
the robustness of complete-information equilibria to the introduction of incomplete information, one
can safely guess that if the common prior assigns probabihty near 1 to the set of events where the
firms are nearly perfectly informed about the underlying nominal shock, then with probability near
1 the response of prices to the underlying nominal shock will be nearly the same as in the common-
knowledge benchmark. Nevertheless, the results of this section do highhght how quantifying the
response of higher-order beliefs is essential for quantifying the response of prices to nominal shocks.
5 Heterogeneous priors
In this section we study how heterogeneous priors regarding the signals firms receive can affect
the behavior of higher-order beliefs and thereby the response of prices to the underlymg nominal
shocks. In particular, we consider a system of heterogeneous priors that induces firms to behave in
equilibrium as if they lived in a world where other firms were less informed about the underlying
nominal shocks. This sustains a partially self-fulfilling equilibrium where firms react little to the
underlying shock, even if they have nearly perfect information about it.
Apart from the mtroduction of heterogeneous priors, the setup is identical to our baseline Calvo
model of Section 3. We again let Of follow an exogenous random walk process. In any given period,
a firm may change its price with probability 1 - A, in which case the price it chooses is a weighted
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average of all future target prices;
oo
p,,i = (1 - 8X)^ {0Xy [(1 - a) E,,tO,+j + aE^,tPt+J] (9)
As in the baseline model, each period firms learn perfectly the nominal demand of the previous
period, 9i-\, and receive a private signal of the current period's nominal demand:
Xi,t = Ot + ei,t.
However, firms disagree on the stochastic properties of the noise in their signals.
In particular, each firm believes that its own signal is an unbiased signal of Of. Specifically, firm
i believes the error in its own private signal is drawn from the following distribution:
e,,t~A^(0,l/K^).
At the same time, each firm believes that the private signals of all other firms are biased. Specifically,
firm i believes that the errors in the private signals of all other firms are drawn independently from
the following distribution:
where 5i^t is the bias that firm i believes to be present in the private signals of other firms. Finally, we
assume that the perceived biases are negatively correlated with the innovation in the fundamental
(the nominal shock). Specifically, wc^ assume that, for all i and all t,
where x S [0, 1] is a parameter that controls the correlation of the perceived bias with the innovation
in the nominal shock. Finally, these perceptions are commonly understood and mutually accepted:
the firms have agreed to disagree. ^°
To understand the difference between the baseline model (which had assumed a common prior)
and the current model (with allows for heterogeneous priors), it is useful to consider the beliefs
'"We have used a related heterogeneous-priors specification in Angeletos and La'O {2009b). albeit within a different
context and for different purposes. We refer the reader to that paper for a more thorough discussion on the modeling
role of heterogeneous priors: they are convenient, but need not be strictly necessary for the type of efl'ccts we
document. For example, in that paper we document how a certain type of sunspot-like fluctuations can obtain with
either heterogeneous priors or a common prior, but the former maintain a higher level of tractability.
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of each firm about the average expectation of Of. In either model, each firm's own (first-order)
expectation of the fundamental is
E^,tOt =
'"'^
Xt + —^— 9t-l
Kx + Kg Kx + Kg
In the baseline model, this implied that each firm believed that the average first-order expectation
in the rest of the popiilation satisfied .^
Kj + Kg Kx -\- Kg
That, is, the firm's second-order expectation was given by
^i.tEi - ; Ei_,6'( H 6t-\.
Kx + Kg Kx + Kg
In contrast, now that firms have heterogeneous priors, each firm believes the average first-order
expectation satisfies
^t — ; ''( ^ ; ^t-i'
That is, the firm's second-order expectation is now given by
Kx + Kg Kx + Kg
Therefore, the heterogeneous priors that we have introduced in this section do not affect first-order
beliefs, but they do affect second- and higher-order beliefs: the higher \' is, the more each firm
believes that the beliefs of others will be less sensitive to innovations 0, even though its own belief
is not affected.
We now examine how this affects equilibrium behavior. We conjecture once again an equilibrium
in which the price set by a firm in period ( is a linear function of (p;_i, 6'(_i,X(, ):
jt-t.t = -P(P(-i>^i-i>2-,,() = 6ip,_i -K 62a-,,f -h63^(-i (10)
for some coefficients h\, 60,63. Accordingly, firm i expects that the price level will satisfy
Pt = Xpt-i + (l-\) J P(pt-uOt-i^x.)dFt{x) (11)
where Ft is the cross-sectional distribution of signals as perceived by the typical firm. Our assump-
tion regarding the heterogeneous priors implies that each firm thinks that the cross-sectional mean
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of the signals in the rest of the population is (1 — x)^t + X^t-i- It follows that each firm expects
the price level to satisfy
Pt = \pt-i + {l-X)P{pt-i,Ot-i.{l-x)Ot + xOt-i)
or equivalently
where
Pt = CiPt-i + €20 1 + 0:^61-1 (12)
ci =A + (1-A)6i, C2 = [l - X)h{l - x) C3 = (1-A)(63 + 62X). (13)
But now recall from the baseline model that, no matter what are the coefficients (ci,C2,C3), the
best response of a firm to (12) is to set a price as in (10), with the coefficients (61,62.^3) defined
by the solution to (8). We conclude that the equilibrium values of the coefficients (61,62,63) and
(ci,C2,C3) are now given by the joint solution of (8) and (13).
Note that x enters only the conditions for C2 and C3 in (13), not the condition for c\. It follows
that the equilibrium value of c\ (and hence also that of 61) remains the same as in our baseline
model (or, equivalently, as in the standard Calvo model). Moreover, the price process continues to
be homogeneous of degree one, so that ci + C2 + C3 = 1. Finally, the equilibrium value of ct now
satisfies -- (..:_.,_,, . _
A(l-ci)
C2 =
A + ci^^fi±^'
Comparing this last condition with the corresponding condition for the baseline model, we
observe that the equilibrium values of (ci,C2,C3) for the present model coincide with those of the
baseline model if the precision of information in that model is adjusted to the value k^ defined by
^X
_
(I ~ \") ^I ,, .s
which is clearly decreasing in x- This observation in turn establishes a certain isomorphism between
the present model and the baseline one: in the heterogeneous-prior economy that we have introduced
here, firms expect the price level to respond to the underlying nominal shock in the same way as in
a common-prior economy that is identical to the oaie in our baseline model except for the fact that
the precision of available information is decreased from n^ to kx-
Along with the fact that, because of strategic complementarity (a > 0), the incentive of a firm
to respond to its own information is lower the lower the expected response of the price level, we
conclude that heterogeneous priors reduce the response of each firm to its own information about
the underlying nominal shock.
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Proposition 3. In the equilibrium of the heterogeneous-priors economy, firms respond to their
information in the same way as m an a common-pnor economy m which the precision of information
that other firms have is a decreasing function of x- By implication, the sensitivity 62 of a firm's price
to its own signal about the underlying nominal shock is also decreasing in x for given precision.
To further appreciate this result, for the moment allow us to abstract from price rigidities (A = 0)
and consider the limit as k^ -^ 00, meaning that each firm is (nearly) perfectly informed about the
shock. In the common-prior world, this would have guaranteed that prices move one-to-one with
the nominal shock and hence that the nominal shock has no real effect. But now let x ^ 1 along
with Kx —» 00 in such a way that the quantity k^ defined in (14) stays bounded away from oc. In
this limit, each firm is perfectly informed about the shock but expects other firms to respond as
if they were imperfectly informed; firms therefore find it optimal to adjust their prices less than
one-to-one in response to the nominal shock, thereby causing the shock to have a real effect, even
though they are perfectly informed about the shock and there is no price rigidity.
The preceding analysis haii focused on how heterogeneous priors affect the instantaneous response
of prices to the underlying shock; in the model considered above, the dynamics of prices after the
initial shock is driven solely by the Calvo mechanics, much alike the baseline model. However,
heterogeneous priors can also affect these dynamics, to the extent that the perceived bias is persistent
over time. To see this, suppose that bias St follows an autoregressive process of the following form:
5t = -xvt + p5t,
for some p G [0, !) One can the easily extend the preceding analysis to show the following.
Proposition 4. There exist coefficients (61,62,63,64), which depend on {\,p), such that the equi-
librium strategy of firm i is given by
Pij = P{pt-i,x,,t,0t-u5t-i) ^ 6ip(-i +b2Xu + bjOt-i +b4St^i
At this point, it is important to recognize that so far we have used the model to make predictions
only about what the firms expect the price level to do and how they respond to their information
about this shock—we have not used the model to make predictions about what we, as outside
observers or "econometricians", expect the price level to do. This is where heterogeneous priors
make things delicate. To analyze the equilibrium strategy of the firm as a function of their signals
(their "types"), we do not need to take a stand on whether the firms signals are "truly" biased or
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not; we only need to postulate the system of their beliefs and then we can use the model to make
predictions about how these beliefs will map into behavior. In contrast, to analyze the impulse
response of the aggregate price level to the underlying shock, it no more suffices to characterize the
mapping from beliefs to behavior; we also need to know on what is the mapping from the underlying
nominal shock to the cross-sectional distribution of beliefs. In particular, we must now take a stand
on how the cross-sectional average of signals relates to the underlying nominal shock.
Here, we could assume either that "econometrician" believes that the signals are biased, so that
the cross-sectional average of x,( is 9i + 5t, or that she believes that they are unbiased, so that the
cross-sectional average of xu is 9t. If we assume the former scenario, then the econometrician's law
of motion of the price level will coincide with the one in the minds of the firms. In particular, it
will be given by
pt = il- X)pt-i + XP{pt-i,dt + ^t,0t-u5t-i),
with the function P given by Proposition 4. If instead we assume the latter scenario, then the
econometrician's law of motion for the price level will differ from the one in the mind of the firms.
In particular, it will be given by ,- • ::,.„, ,., ,,.: . „,;:; ;,,,
ft = (1 - X)pt-i + XPipt-uet,et-uSt-i),
with the function P given once again by Proposition 4. The only difference in these two law of
motions in that the cross-sectional average of Xtt is assumed to be (9( + 6t in the first case and (9^ in
the latter case. ^
For the remainder of the analysis, we will assume the latter scenario, keeping though in mind
three properties. First, under this scenario the econometrician predicts that firms react to Sf not
because their signals are biased, but only because they believe that other firms will do so. Second,
the two scenarios deliver similar qualitative properties as long as q > 0. And third, the quantita-
tive difference between the two scenarios vanishes as a —> 1. Both of these properties are direct
implications of strategic complementarity.
Assuming the second scenario and combining the stochastic process of 9t and 6t with the law
of motion for the price level, we conclude that the dynamics of the economy, as seen from the
perspective of the econometrician, are given by the following:
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Figure 8: inflation Figure 9: output
with the coefficients (61, 62! ^3 > ^4) being determined as in Proposition 4. We can then use this
system, along with the fact that real output is j/( = 6t - pt- to simulate the impulse responses of
inflation and output to a positive innovation in Vf (of a size equal to the standard deviation of Vt).
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate these impulse responses for different values of \ and p. The baseline
(common-prior) model corresponds to x =^ p — 0. As anticipated, we see that letting x > but
keeping p = affects the impact effect of the innovation but not its persistence. In particular,
in the period that the the innovation in nominal demand materializes, the response of inflation
is dampened by letting x > 0, and by implication the positive effect on real output is amplified.
But as long as p = the dynamics following this initial period are determined solely by the Calvo
propagation mechanism and hence the persistence is the same as in the baseline model. This is
because any discrepancy between either first-order or higher-order beliefs and the true value of
the shock vanishes after the initial period. In contrast, letting p > permits the discrepancy to
persist in higher order beliefs even after it has vanished in first-order beliids, thereby contributing
to additional persistence in the real effects of the nominal shock.
To sum up, heterogeneous priors can help rationalize significant inertia the response of prices to
changes in nommal demand simply b}' inducing inertia in the response of higher-order expectations.
This is true no matter how high is the firms' precision of information, that is, the sensitivity of first-
order beliefs to the nominal shock. Moreover, this insight is not specific to the contemporaneous
response of beliefs to the shock, but also to the entire dynamic adjustment of the beliefs. Indeed,
in work that we do not report here because of space limitations, we have obtained similar results
in a heterogeneous-priors variant of Woodford (2003), in which the shock never becomes common
knowledge, thus allowing both first- and high-order beliefs converge to the truth only slowly over
time. But whereas in Woodford (2003) the rate of convergence of higher-order beliefs is tightly
connected to that of first-order beliefs, heterogeneous priors permits us to break this connection, so
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that higher-order behefs and prices may converge very slowly to their complete-information values
even if first-order beliefs converge very fast.
Finally, note that the present model shares a bit of the flavor of the model with uncertain
precisions that we considered in the previous section: there we focused on the possibility that firms
may face uncertainty about the precision of other firms' information about the shock; here we
showed how heterogeneous priors can induce firms to behave as if they expected other firms to have
less precise information than themselves. In either case, the key is the behavior of higher-order
behefs as opposed to first-order beliefs.-'^
6 Heterogenous priors and cost-push shocks
In the preceding two sections we highlighted how higher-order beliefs can induce inertia in the
response of prices to nominal shocks in the economy. In so doing, we focused on the role of higher-
order beliefs for the propagation of certain structural shocks, namely nominal shocks. In this section,
building on Angeletos and La'O (2009b), we highlight how higher-order beliefs can themselves be
the source of a certain type of fluctuations in the price level and real output—fluctuations that
resemble the ones generated by cost-push, or mark-up, shocks. .^
For this purpose, we modify the model of the previous section as follows. Firms continue to
have heterogeneous priors about their signals, but the perceived bias is no more correlated with the
underlying nominal shock. Rather, the bias follows an independent stochastic process, given by
''.'
St = p5t-i +uJt - ' ' ' ^ (15)
where u>t is a Normally distributed shock that is i.i.d. across time and independent of 0.^ for all r.
Following similar steps as in the previous section, one can then show the following.
"The similarity we obtain between our two models is reminiscent of a point made in Lipman (2003). That paper
shows that, if one fixes a specific hierarchy of beliefs, one cannot tell apart a common prior from heterogeneous
priors from properties of any finite order of beliefs. This in turn suggests that in certain cases it may be possible
to replicate, or approximate, the equilibrium behavior that obtains for any particular hierarchy of beliefs with either
a common prior or heterogeneous priors. At the same time, because the reduced-form game that characterizes the
general equilibrium of our economy admits a unique rationalizable outcome, and hence also a unique correlated
equilibrium, the results of Kajii and Morris (1997) suggest that the complete-information equilibrium is robust to
the introduction of incomplete information. It tlien follows that, witli a common prior, one needs sufficient "noise"
to make the predictions of the model under incomplete information sufficiently different.
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Proposition 5. There exist coefficients (61,62,^3,^4,^5) such that the equilibrium strategy of firm
i is given by
Pi,t = biPt-i + b2X,j +b30t^i +b46t^i +b5UJt
Taking once again the perspective of an econometrician who iDeheves that the signals are unbi-
ased, we obtaui the unpulse responses of the price level from the following dynamics:
Pt
1
p
A62 + A63 A64 1 - A + ,\6i
'
e,.: 1
dt-i + Vt + 1
Pt-i A62 A65
t^'t
In Figures 10 and 11, we illustrate the impulse responses of inflation and real output to a positive
innovation in Uf Such a shock causes firms to raise their prices even though aggregate nominal
demand hasn't change. As a result, inflation increases and output contracts. The resulting fluctu-
ations thus resembled to those often identified as the impact of "cost-push" shocks. When p = 0,
this cost-push-like shock is transitory; the moderately persistent effects on real output are then due
merely to the Calvo mechanics. When instead p > 0, the bias is itself persistent, which contributes
to additional persistence in the real effects of the shock.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we studied how the combination of incomplete information and infrequent price ad-
justment may dampen the response of prices to nominal shocks. We did so through a series of
variant models which progressively shifted focus from the stickiness of prices and the precision
of available information about the shocks to the dynamics of higher-order expectations. We thus
sought to highlight that quantifying the degree of price stickiness and the speed of learning (i.e.,
the rate at which first-order beliefs adjust to the shock) does not suffice for quantifying the rate
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at which higher-order behefs adjust, and therefore also does not suffice for quantifying the rate at
which prices adjust. We also illustrated how the distinct role of higher-order beliefs could be readily
accommodated within the Calvo framework without any sacrifice in analytical tractability—which
in turn may pave the way to bringing the ideas of this paper closer to the data.
We thus hope that more effort will be devoted to quantifying the behavior of expectations and
their implications for the degree of price inertia at the macro level. How can this be done? One
possibility, at least in principle, would be to start conducting surveys of the higher-order beliefs of
economic agents. We find this both impractical and unnecessary. As we further argue in Angeletos
and La'O (2009a), in our eyes dispersed information—and higher-order beliefs—are merely modeling
devices for capturing the uncertainty that economic agents may face about aggregate economic
activity beyond the one that they face about the underlying fundamentals. Indeed, in macro models
and games alike, higher-order beliefs matter only to the extent that they impact forecasts of the
equilibrium actions of other agents. Furthermore, in most macro models this is typically summarized
in forecasts of few macroeconomic variables, such as the price level and the level of aggregate output
or employment. Therefore, we do not think that it is essential to collect data on the details of higher-
order beliefs. Rather, we believe that data on forecasts of economic activity can provide more direct
guidance for quantifying the type of effects we document here. •
Turning to potential implications for monetary policy, we wish to make the following points. If
one interprets the exogenous shock in our anal^'sis as an innovation in monetary policy, one may
conclude that our results justify strong real effects for exogenous changes to monetary policy. We
would not necessarily favor such an interpretation. The theory we have presented here does not
imply the same price inertia with respect to all shocks in the economy. Rather, it is crucial to
that there is non-trivial lack of common knowledge about the shock under consideration. But then
note that information about changes in monetary policy is readily available and closely followed,
not only from participants in financial markets but also from the general public when it seems to
matter. Moreover, it is commonly understood that this is the case; there is a lot of communication
in the market regarding monetary policy, and financial pric(;s adjust within seconds to changes in
monetary policy. In our eyes, these are indications that assuming common knowledge about the
innovations to monetary policy might not be a terrible benchmark after all.
At the same time, we suspect a significant lack of common knowledge for a variety of other
"structural" shocks hitting the economy, such aggregate productivity shocks, financial shocks, labor-
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market shocks, and so on. We then expect incomplete information to have more bite on monetary
policy in a different dimension: the interest-rate rule followed by the central bank can affect how
much the incompleteness of information about these shocks impacts equilibrium outcome. In par-
ticular, the central bank can control the degree of strategic complementarity in pricing decision by
designing it response to realized inflation and output; in so doing, it can also mitigate the inertia
effects we have documented here. Further exploring this possibility is left for future work.^^
^^The insight that the response of policy to macroeconomic outcomes can impact the decentraUzed use of informa-
tion, and thereby the response of the economy to both the fundamentals, and noise draws from Angeletos and Pavan
(2009). See also Angeletos and La'O (2008) and Lorenzoni (2009) for some recent work on the design of optimal
monetary policy when information is dispersed.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The condition that determines cj can be restated as
/(ci,A,/?) = a, (16)
where
_
(l-/3Aci)(ci-A)
^^'^'^'^)=ci(l-A)(l-/?A)-
As mentioned in the main text, there are two sohitions to this equation—one with ci > 1 and
Ci G (A, 1)—and we focus on the non-explosive one.
Clearly, that the aforementioned equation is independent of k^ and Kg, implying that c\ is
independent of the information structure. Moreover,
dci ^ df/dX ^ ci(l - ci)(l - /3ci)(l - p\^)
dX df/dci X{1 - X){1 - pX){l - Pcj)
dci ^ 1 ^ X[l-pc\) .,,.--:
da df/dci c2(l- A)(1-/?A) ' , ' , ' :
, /
It follows that ci is increasing in both A and a. Next, recall from the main text that C2 satisfies
A(l-ci) ' _
Co =
A + ci^
Since cj is independent of [K^.Kg), it is immediate that C2 is increasing in Kx/kB) and since cs —
1 — ci — C2, it is immediate that C3 is decreasing in KxJkq. Moreover, since the above expression
for C2 is independent of o. for given c\ and is decreasing in ci, and since c\ is itself increasing in q,
it follows that C2 is decreasing in q. Finally, the fact that C2 is non-monotonic in A and that C3 is
non-monotone in a can be establish by numerical example.
Proof of Proposition 2. The equilibrium can be characterized in a similar fashion as in the
baseline model. First, by aggregating the strategy of the firms, we infer that the coefficients
(ci, C2,fi,C2,(, C3,/i, C3,i) must solve the following system:
ci = A+(l- A)5i . .
C2,s = (1-A)[762,. + (l-7)&2,-5]
C3,, = (1 - A) [763,, + (1 - 7)^3,-5]
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where we use the convention that -s = / when s = h and —s = h when s = I. Next, by taking the
firms' best response, we infer that the coefficients (&i,62,/ii^2,/. ^3,/ii ^3,i) solve the following system:
61 = ((1-/?A)q + (/3A)6i)ci
""
'
^^2,. = [ (1 - /?A) (1 - a) + ((1 - flX)o^ + (/3A)6i) (7C2,. + (1 - 7)c2,-.)
b3,s = [{l-pX){l-a) + {{l-3X)a+iPX)bi){^C2,s + {l~l)c2,-s)
+(/3A) (i(62,, + 62,,,) + (63,/ + 63,,)) ] -^
+ ((1 - pX)a + {pX)b,) (7C3,, + (1 - 7)c3,-s)
.
Clearly, ci and fej continue to be determined by the same equations as in the baseline model. Once
again, we focus on the solution with ci S (0, 1). Given this solution, the remainder of the conditions
consist a linear system, which admits a unique solution for the coefficients (62,5, 63,5. C2,5, C2^s)se{h.i}-
Proof of Proposition 3. In the main text we showed that the equilibrium values of (ci, C2, C3)
and (61,62,63) are determined by the solution to (8) and (13); that ci and 61 continue to be
determined as in the baseline model and are thus independent of x; and that co satisfies
A(l-ci)
C2
A + ci
HO+\Ki
which is decreasing in \. Along with the fact that C2 = (1 - A)62(l - x)i we get that
A(l-ci)
(1-A) A + ci^ + (ci-A)x
which is also decreasing in x> since cj G (A, 1).
Proof of Propositions 4 and 5. To nest both the model of Section 5 and that of Section 6, we
let the bias be given by
St =
-X'l'f +^t + pSt-v
We then conjecture an equilibrium in which the price set by a firm in period t is a. linear function
Oi {pt-^l,Xt,^t-lSt-l,uJt)^
P^,i = P{pt-i,Xi^t,dt-i,St^i,uJt) = bipt-i +b2Xij, +bsOt-i + b45t-i + bsojt (17)
for some coefficients 61,62,63,64,65.
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Our specification of the heterogeneous priors implies that each firm thinks that the cross-sectional
mean of the signals in the rest of the population is xt = 9t + 6t = {1 - x)9t + Y^t-i + P^t-i + Wf . It
follows that each firm expects the price level to satisfy
or equivalently
where
Pt = Ap;-i + (1 - X) P{pt-i,xt,6t-},5t-i,i^t)
Pt = ciPt-\ + C29t + CiOt-i + c^St-i + csuJt
ci = A + (1-A)6i, C2 = (l-A)62(l-x), C3 = (1 - A) (62\ + 63) (19)
CA = {I - X) {b2P + bi) , C5 = (l-A)(62+65)
Next, note that we may write the firm i's best response (9) as ':
'
.- p^,t = il-PX)[{l-a)E,^tOt + aE,^tPt] + i0X)E^,tm,t+i. "
Given that the firm expects the price level to evolve according to (18), for the firm's best response
to be consistent with our conjecture (17), it must be that the coefficients (61,62,63,64,65) solve the
following system:
61 = [(l-/3A)Q + (/?A)6i]ci ,..-•-' , (20)
62 = [(1 - /JA) (1 - a + ac2) + ipX) + (pX) [bico + 62 + 63 - ,y64)]
""^
63 = [(1 -PX){l-a + ac2) + iPX) + (/?A) (61C2 + 60 + 63 - ,164)]
''''^
Kx + Kf)
+ {l-6X)ac3 + ipX)biC3 + ipX)biX
64 = (1 - /?A)ac4 + (/3A)6iC4 + (/?A)64/5 ' ^
65 = (1-^A)qc5 + (/?A)6iC5 + (/3A)64 '
Combining conditions (19) and (20) gives us a system of equations which characterizes the equilib-
rium values for (61,62,63,64, 65, ci, C2, C3, C4,C5).
It is immediate that the conditions that determine cj and 61 are identical to those in the baseline
model. As in the baseline model, we ignore the solution that has ci > 1 and focus on the solution
that has ci S (0, 1). Given this solution, the remaining conditions define a linear system, which has
a unique solution for the remaining coefficients.
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